The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the 'permanent WRAP URL' above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription. Laughter, lamentation and detestation as drives to terrorism knowledge The contemporary fascination with terrorism in Anglo-American popular culture, political discourse, news reportage and beyond is boundless and well-documented. In this article we explore contemporary productions of terrorism as the outcome of three drives to knowledge: laugher, lamentation and detestation. Drawing on a range of social and cultural practices -including jokes, street art, film, memorial projects, elite rhetoric and abuse scandals -we make two arguments. First, that humour, grief and hatred underpin and saturate the contemporary desire to know terrorism. And, second, thatalthough these drives function in multiple and ambiguous ways -they serve to institute a distance between the subject and object of terrorism knowledge, not least by encouraging us to laugh at those punished for terrorism, mourn for those lost in attacks, and direct our hatred toward those responsible. This analysis not only opens fresh insight on the workings of terrorism discourse in the post-9/11 period, it also points to connections between contemporary 'critical' work on terrorism and debate on the role of emotions and affect in international politics more broadly.
Introduction
The contemporary fascination with terrorism is boundless. In Anglo-American politics, journalism, popular culture, and everyday life there exists a seemingly insatiable appetite for 2 the representation, visualisation and consumption of this threat. With every new act of unconventional violence, analysts rush to extrapolate new fears and targets (Mueller 2006 ); assisted in their task by new systems and technologies of risk measurement (see Amoore and de Goede 2008) . Geopolitical developments are scrutinised as much for their impact on, and links to, groups such as al-Qaeda, Boko Haram or ISIS, as they are in their own terms.
i In domestic politics, terrorism remains a potent battleground between interested parties: the drawn-out fates of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his fellow Guantanamo Bay inmates amongst the most prominent contemporary chips in these games.
ii Films, video games, television productions and other cultural forms shape our understanding of former and contemporary organizations, interpellating us as potential victims or heroes in their narratives (Power 2007; Sisler 2008 , see also Waldmann 2012; . And academia, of course, has been no less affected by this contemporary 'boom', witness the deluge of new publications, conferences, journals, research monies, and the like: all simultaneously indicative and constitutive of this fascination (see Silke 2004: 25-27 ).
The quality of much work within this recent terrorism boom has been much debated.
One prominent review of this literature, for example, pointed to a series of continuing biases in its focus, including a dearth of historical contextualisation and a continuing prioritisation of 'Islamist' terrorism (Silke 2009; see also Gunning 2007; Ranstorp 2009 ). While such hand-wringing may serve strategic as well as intellectual functions (Stampnitzky 2011) , it has opened space for the emergence of explicitly 'critical' research around (counter-)terrorism, building on a small number of earlier pioneering efforts (e.g. George 1991; Zulaika and Douglass 1996) . Such work has proved particularly influential in unmasking hidden, obscured and forgotten instances of terrorism -especially in discussion around 'state terrorism' (Jackson et al 2010; Tyner et al 2014) -and in mapping the sites and forms of discourse through which terrorism is produced as an object of knowledge. Although much of this has focused on elite (counter-)terrorism discourse, studies of non-linguistic 3 representational practices and 'vernacular' or 'subaltern' constructions of 'terror' are also, importantly, beginning to emerge (Solomon 2012; Jarvis and Lister 2013; Furtado 2015) .
In this article, we contribute to these recent 'critical' literatures by offering an exploratory reading of three affective 'drives' underpinning the constitution of terrorism as an object of knowledge: laughter, lamentation and detestation. Taking inspiration from the work of Michel Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche and others, we argue that these impulses to ridicule, grieve and fear terrorist violence are central to contemporary constructions of terrorism and recognisable across multiple discursive sites: formal and informal, organised and spontaneous.
Taking them seriously, we suggest, contributes to recent critical analyses by allowing us to ask: how do emotional responses to terrorism play into the construction of terrorism knowledge? What are the politics of laughing at, fearing and hating terrorism? And, how is affect situated epistemologically vis-à-vis terrorism?
Drives to knowledge
A useful starting point for our analysis is Michel Foucault's 1973 lectures at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. These lectures are important as part of his broader effort to tie domains and technologies of knowledge to the social practices of their emergence (Foucalt 2000) . In them, Foucault offers a staccatoed history of truth from the test, to the inquiry and, finally, the examination. In the former, which Foucault illustrates via Homer's Iliad, truth is produced by way of direct competition -a struggle against oneself, one's opponent, or the elements -and governed by rules, through which successful completion of a designated task (swearing before the gods, taking an oath, healing after a physical ordeal, or triumphing in combat, for instance) offers evidence of the accused's innocence (Foucault 2000: 33-38) . The second mode of truth establishment -the inquiry -was consolidated, for Foucault, in the twelfth century, before going on to radically reorganise Western judicial and scholarly activities. Tied to the birth of the modern state, truth emerges here via a densely 4 ritualized process of investigation: it is something to be discovered by an ostensibly disinterested but authoritative party following consultation with evidence, the interrogation of witnesses and so forth. The examination, finally, presents us with a new mode of truth production, linked by Foucault to the disciplinary society. Here, knowledge is produced via constant, uninterrupted supervision (of deviants, for example), and intrinsically linked to social transformations (in prisons, education, the workplace), and the birth of the 'human sciences' (Foucault 2000: 59) .
Underpinning this genealogy of truth is an endorsement of Nietzsche's earlier account of the invention of knowledge. For Nietzsche (1974) -as, subsequently, for Foucaultknowledge is to be understood as the outcome of a struggle between passions or 'instincts' triggered by our embeddedness in the world 1 . Critiquing Spinoza's Tractatus Politicus for its separation of knowledge and affect, Nietzsche (1974: 261-262 ) set out to counter the rationalist trajectory of Western philosophy, and to take seriously the role of the 'passions' in our knowledge of the world (also Foucault 2000: 11). Knowledge, for Nietzsche (in Foucault's later terminology), is therefore janus-faced. It is a product of chance and conflicta protracted compromise between the conflicts and tensions between drives -rather than any direct correspondence to the world: with the latter depicted as 'chaos for all eternity' (Nietzsche 1974: 167-169) , un-beholden to any definitive law of interpretation.
For Nietzsche and Foucault alike, knowledge possesses no automatic relationship with the 'world of things' that it claims to resemble. The connection between the two is one of contingency, not necessity. Nor are the origins of knowledge to be located in the nature or instincts of a prior, founding subject; as Foucault (2000: 9) notes, paraphrasing Nietzsche:
"…between knowledge and the world to be known there is as much difference as between knowledge and human nature". If we accept this, then power, violence, and, ultimately, politics all enter the fold, for knowledge becomes something imposed on the world and its 1 Sara Ahmed (2004) makes a similar argument using a feminist approach in The Cultural Politics of Emotion.
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subjects; at once constitutive of that which it claims to represent, and necessarily imperfect.
As Foucault (1984: 127) suggested in one of his most-cited passages:
we must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would only have to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favour. We must conceive discourse as a violence which we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose on them.
Foucault's investigations into this problem of knowledge are well-known, and fleshed out in greater detail away from these lectures (e.g. Foucault 1998; also compare Connolly 1985 and Taylor 1985) . These lectures are significant for our purposes, however, because of this endorsement of Nietzsche's account of the passions that drive knowledge. For, in a passage of particular relevance to contemporary understandings of violences deemed 'terrorist', Foucault (2000: 11) states:
Intelligere, to understand, is nothing more than a certain game, or more exactly, the outcome of a certain game, of a certain compromise or settlement between ridere [to laugh], lugere [to lament], and detestari [to detest]. Nietzsche says that we understand only because behind all that there is the interplay and struggle of those three instincts, of those three mechanisms, or those three passions that are expressed by laughter, lamentation, and detestation.
Elaborating this, Foucault makes two points. First, that each of these drives establishes a distance (or an attempt at distance) between the subject and object of knowledge. To laugh, lament, or detest is to resist identification with that which is being laughed at, lamented, or detested; to mark one's separation from the thing in the world. Second, each of these drives also constitutes a 'bad' relation between subject and object; knowledge is produced from a momentary impasse or compromise between the negative impulses of mockery, hostility and 6 fear. Although Foucault follows Nietzsche in locating these drives within the individual subject, our focus here, as will become clear, is on their operation at the level of the social.
Affecting Terrorism
Nietzsche and Foucault's account of these three negative drives to knowledge has real prescience for contemporary work on the impact of affect and emotion on socio-political life.
Wide-ranging and heterogeneous -one summary identifies eight trajectories of current affect research across neuroscience, psychoanalysis, queer theory, and beyond (Seigworth and Gregg 2010) -this work has also begun to influence research on international politics.
Christine Sylvester (2011 Sylvester ( , 2013 Affect is understood here as amorphous potential that remains outside of discourse, which is difficult to articulate but nevertheless has effects within discourse. Emotion, on the other hand, can be viewed as the'feeling'that signifiers represent once names are attached to affect, thereby conferring on them discursive reality.
Nietzsche's discussion of 'drives to knowledge' is a stimulating one, in part, because it does not map neatly on to the distinction between affect and emotions. On the one hand, Nietzsche situates laughter, lamentation and detestation as 'instincts' which precede knowledge of an object; indeed, it is the struggle between these affective drives which contributes to the distancing of object from subject, and thus its entry into the field of knowledge. This focus on a subject's embeddedness in pre-linguistic, corporeal, drives seems more closely related to affect than emotions. But at the same time, Nietzsche's focus on laughter, lamentation and detestation may also be read as a discussion of nameable emotional states. Nietzsche's 'instincts' may be approached as constituting the field upon which knowledge production occurs. Taking this insight seriously therefore enables researchers to explore the cultural representation of topics such as terrorism not only as forms of representation, but also as the outcome of competition between impulses to laughter, mourning and hatred. This approach also, importantly, enables exploration of affect or emotion as properties of social practices, rather than as merely internal, individualised, states. Nietzsche's conception of the 'drive' is sufficiently broad to enable us to consider social practices of mockery, mourning and othering as collective affective instincts that, in their mutual conflict, isolate an object within the field of knowledge and enable its discursive constitution.
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Laughter
What is the significance of laughing at terror? Despite the rush to situate 9/11 as marking a 'death of irony' (Markovitz 2004: 201) , and accounts of a subsequent 'public humour moratorium' (Kuipers 2005: 74) -at least in the US -this first of Nietzsche's drives toward knowledge has special prominence, we argue, in contemporary productions of terrorism.
In the first instance, humour offers a relatively straightforward coping mechanism assisting those seeking to come to terms with particular attacks, or the threat of terrorism more broadly (see also Brown and Penntinen 2013). Laughing at terrorism here presents an attempt to tame fear of this -ostensibly random -violence; the incongruities on which humour relies offering opportunity (if temporary) to escape more worldly concerns (Kuipers 2005: 71) . One Internet site, for example, offers its collection of 9/11 jokes under the selfconsciously playful banner: "This 9/11 Joke Collection Will Save America! After 5 Years, You Can LAUGH! It's official!" (Ooze.com 2006) In so doing, it both spotlights humour's capacity to alleviate anxieties about external events (Coser 1959: 175) at the same time as it illustrates the limitations of these efforts with its ironic style (reinforced in the site's own repeated ridicule of the jokes). By parodying political calls for a return to normality after those attacks -as (Powell, cited in Jarvis 2009: 113) put it: 'We need people to go back out to stores. We need people to go to movies and theaters. We need to restore a sense of normalcy in our life' -the site invites visitors to share in its conspiratorial tone.
Less inclusive, but similar in function, is an incident recounted by James Der Derian (2002), wherein, "President Bush was given room to joke in a morale-boosting visit to the CIA, saying he's 'spending a lot of quality time lately' with George Tenet, the director of the CIA." On the US television show, Saturday Night Live, a similarly high profile figure from 9/11's aftermath -New York Mayor Giuliani -signalled his own acquiescence to laughter in the wake of those attacks: "When producer Lorne Michaels asked the mayor if it was okay to 9 be funny, Giuliani joked, "Why start now?" (implicitly informing viewers that it was, in fact, okay to laugh)" (Spigel 2004) . In all these examples, the status of terrorism as a contemporary taboo (Zulaika and Douglass 1996: 149-153 The multiplying comedic dynamics of the War on Terror therefore play a considerable role in the constitution of terrorism as an object of knowledge. Through social practices of joking and mockery, a separation is asserted between the subject and object of knowledge production. We laugh at the object of the joke, rendering it intelligible through its entrance into the field of knowledge. And, by laughing and appreciating the aesthetic qualities of the joke, we participate in terrorism's consolidation as a particular form of threat: one that is variously depoliticised, tamed, and ridiculed in the above examples. This drive to laughter helps to constitute terrorism within what Ranciere (2004) 
Lamentation
Lamentation, as the expression of sorrow, is the second drive we explore here as an affective condition of emergence for terrorism knowledge. In this context, we witness the production of terrorism as an object of knowledge through sanctioned expressions of grief which work to decry a slaughter as unprovoked, random and unreasonable. Lamentation -which constitutes a boundary between acceptable 'strategic' violence (war, collateral damage, deterrence) and the excessive, irrational violence of 'terrorism' -is particularly evident in four contemporary cultural forms discussed below: immediate practices of condemnation; iconographies of the slain; the resolve to triumph; and permanent memorials to victims of terrorism. All four of these practices displace acts of violence from the realm of understanding, rationality or empathy. Indeed lamentation 'knows' terrorism through constituting this threat as something not to be tamed through ridicule, as in the case of laughter above, but as something rationally un-knowable and exceptional. These processes demonstrate a fierce determination to refuse knowledge of the strategic motivations for violent action Since the end of the Cold War and the events of 9-11, the tone of lamentation has shifted. The will to triumph is now performed against the crimes of an enemy beyond crime; one whose behaviour is constituted as an exceptional threat driven by apocalyptic ideology (e.g. Laqueur 2000; Cameron 2015b ). This enemy must be defeated, but also cannot be defeated: perpetual vigilance is needed because we can never be assured of our preparation and prevention success. Hence the need for 'unshakeable resolve' in the face of endless threat 
Detestation
The third Nietzschean passion within the production of, here, terrorism knowledge is detestation. Through hating, repelling and shaming its object, detestation works, we suggest, to confirm and reproduce an uncomplicatedly antithetical self/other relationship; a dynamic that becomes especially acute in cases practices of humiliation waged upon the captured, frightened or dead terrorist body. Humiliation takes many forms here, but serves to remove recognition of its recipient as sentient and human, degrading them to the level of abjection.
Julia Kristeva (1982) writes of abjection as a visual recognition of horror which breaks down the separation of subject and object, destabilising the viewer's subject position. The feeling one endures upon viewing a loved one's corpse, for example, is that of abjection: one's own death becomes palpable and the illusions of Cartesian subjectivity come crashing down before the brute materiality of decaying flesh and juices. Yet, practices of detestation performed upon terrorist bodies do not induce horror within the perpetrator, quite the contrary.
Rather, the abjection of the terrorist body is purposefully enacted to induce that body's separation from the categories of human, rights-bearer and recognised being. Humiliation of the terrorist body drives a separation between the object and the discursive category of human, so that terrorism can be 'known' through its abjection. Similarly, drawing from Freudian insights, psychoanalytic literatures on disgust also explore the connection between visceral bodily feelings of disgust and the entry into (or reproduction of) the symbolic order (Greenberg & Mitchell 1983) .
The purposeful and functional inducement of abjection upon another's body is discussed, in different wording, in Elaine Scarry's (1985) seminal exploration of torture: The Body in Pain. Scarry's treatise explores the unique quality of pain, such that it destroys access to language. There are no words which can adequately express severe pain -hence the resort to screaming -because pain's affective power removes one from the Cartesian subject position and revokes one's subject position as a speaking, human subject. Torture, for Scarry, is therefore a purposeful dehumanisation which removes its victim's access to language.
Interrogatory questions are barked as if their answers were crucial, but their role is only to force the detainee's self-betrayal. Although performed as crucial by the regime, such questions become irrelevant to the person suffering extreme pain -who will say anything to make the pain stop. Agony-induced confessions function as nothing more than a performative testament and the captive's loss of 'world, self, and voice' (Scarry 1985: 35) . That shrinking world of the captive -now positioned as a torturer's puppet performing required scriptsexists in dialectic with the expanding worlds of the torturer and the regime; the latter, here, having doubled their voices by appropriating those of the tortured (Heath-Kelly 2013: 24-26).
Drawing on the insights of Kristeva and Scarry to illustrate Nietzsche's point on the epistemological significance of affective drives, we argue that abjection is enacted upon the terrorist body as a manifestation of the detestation drive which renders distant the subject and object of terrorism knowledge. Where violence and humiliation are inflicted upon bodies to produce them as abject, their perpetrators do not experience abjection's horror because the detestation drive separates the terrorist body from sentient personhood and inserts it instead in the place of Agamben's (1998) Homo Sacer. The terrorist body -now reconfigured as the figure that can be violated or killed without incurring punishment -becomes a repository of knowledge to be accessed via the visiting of a hatred-induced 'test', to return to Foucualt's history of truth with which we began our discussion.
This analysis of detestation enables us to understand the pervasive humiliation and excessive violence waged upon bodies during the War on Terror. The scale of these practices, as witnessed at Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and in the everyday humiliation incurred by persons subjected to Islamaphobic treatment far exceeds the instrumental violence required to injure or kill: for instance in the dismemberment of Afghan civilian corpses by coalition soldiers (Gregory 2015) . 
Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that contemporary (re)productions of terrorism are saturated by laughter, lamentation, and detestation. These affective drives to knowledge are evident in discursive sites as diverse as jokes, formal memorials, the abuse of detainees and civilians, and elite political language. Importantly, these drives play out and combine in different, 'chaotic' (Nietzsche 1974: 167-169) , ways across time and space: hence the changing nature of official commemorative practices in the movement from plaque to monument, and the 23 emergence of new opportunities for humour presented by transformations in security regimes such as the introduction of body scanners at airports.
Laughter, we have shown, serves multiple, ambiguous functions in the affective landscape of terror. At once it helps to: constitute terrorism as a particular type ofdepoliticised, and perhaps manageable -threat; normalise counter-terrorism practice and technologies; and facilitate the contestation of this normalisation (for instance in the case of irreverent street art). Lamentation, similarly, proceeds via multiple pathways, including immediate condemnations of specific attacks, the production of iconographies of the slain, official memorialising practices, and promises of future hope and justice in the 'resolve to triumph'. Here, too, space for ambiguity exists. The first three of these practices combine to mark the event-ness of a particular tragedy (although the familiarity of these practices of course highlights equivalences with similar events). The 'resolve to justice' narrative, in contrast, inserts a linear temporality into a tragedy's aftermath: telling a story of (typically) a nation or community's eventual, future, recovery and return to normality. Importantly, each of the contemporary manifestations of this drive explored above again works to militate against discussion of terrorism's rationalities or, indeed, politics. Detestation, finally, is particularly acute, we have argued, in the waging of excessive violence upon the bodiesliving and dead -of those deemed terrorist by others. Indeed, it is the power of this third drive to knowledge that helps to account for the absence of empathy we might expect to accompany the witnessing of abjection brought on by such horror and humiliation.
v Taking these drives to knowledge seriously is important because it sheds light on the emergence of particular types of (counter-)terrorist knowledge, and on the connections between seemingly discrete social and discursive practices. It also, we suggest, helps to account for the resonance or success of particular productions of terrorism within and beyond, say, popular culture or elite political speech (Solomon 2012 therefore to offer opportunity for connecting these research agendas, given the significance of laughter, lamentation and detestation in the structuring of (counter-)terrorism's affective terrain. By beginning our analysis with Foucault and Nietzsche's earlier discussion, moreover, we hope also to highlight the value of canonical texts in political theory to each of these literatures. As argued above, Nietzsche's 'drives' or 'instincts' problematise the affect/emotion distinction which underpins much recent research in this area. They also, however, encourage researchers to delve into the epistemological significance of practices of humiliation, lamentation and laughter as social, collective phenomena which stabilise the production of discourse. Laughter, lamentation and detestation are more than reactions to an event. Rather, they constitute objects of knowledge by affectively framing them as separate from the knowing subject. A complementary reading can be found within Sara Ahmed's analysis of affective circulation, where emotions produce distinctions of inside/outside and psychological/social as their effects (Ahmed 2004). For Ahmed, our capacities to feel result in the articulation of objects (distinct from the body) which impacted upon us -constituting the separation.
Although we have employed Foucault and Nietzsche's tripartite distinction between laughter, lamentation and detestation to structure our discussion, this should only be taken as a heuristic: one which is able to spotlight ambiguities within, competition between, and continuities across, specific inventions of terrorism. There is, we suggest, real scope for further investigation of alternative 'drives to knowledge' -such as, for instance, fear (Robin
